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IN THE

SUPRE~E

COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SANDBERG, WANDA SANDBERG,
Administratrix of the ESTATE OF
~AYNE SANDBERG, Deceased; JEFFREY
SCOTT SANDBERG; SUSAN SANDBERG
\:iv \~ANDA SANDBERG, her Guardia~,

h'A:JDA

)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.

ROBERT D. KLEIN, AVALON KLEIN,
JANE DOE and all other persons
unknown claiming any right, title
or interest in the real property
described in Plaintiff's Complaint
adverse to Plaintiffs' Ownership
or any cloud upon Plaintiffs'
title thereto,
Defendants and
Respondents,
AND

In the Matter of the ESTATE
OF
\,JAYNE SANDBERG,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 15146

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants filed their action to quiet title to 391.84 acres
of unimproved real property in St. George, Utah, and Respondent
filed a counterclaim seeking specific performance of an option
granted by Sandbergs to Respondent.

-1-
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PROCEEDINGS

DELO~

AND DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL CCCRT

After the filing of the Complaint, and pursuant to a stipulation of the parties,

the trial court entered an order consolida

the civil action with a probate proceeding in which the same issue:;
were pending and granted leave to Respondent to file a

(R. 353-54).

CountercLti~

Appellants' Complaint is in the record at page 1, and

Respondent's Counterclaim is in the record at page 166._h/
Appellants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Memorandrnn
and an AmendcJ :·lemorandur:: in support thereof (R.171,
Respondent filed a
support thereof (R

~lotion

173, 215).

for Summary Judgment and a Memorandum in

3~~.269).

The two Motions came on for hearing

before the trial court on Xarch 15,

1977.

At that hearing the

trial court engaged counsel in a careful and penetrating dialogue
wherein both counsel made repeated assurances that there were no
issues of fact and that the matter could be properly disposed of on
the Motions and the materials in the file.

The lower court noted

that the matter was set for trial and indicated a willingness to
hear the Motions only if counsel agreed there were no facts in
dispute and that the trial setting could be vacated.

Counsel

repeatedly insisted that such was the case and agreed to vacate th2
trial setting and proceed on the Motions
at 5-8).

_J./

(transcript of Harch 15th.

Thereafter, the Motions were argued to the court, and

The references to the record are to the civil file since the
probate file contains no material facts that are not in the
civil file.
1-!rs. Sandberg remarried prior to the commencec•en:
of the action and her correct name is now Kurt.
Since t!1e
documents are in the name of Sandberg, the election has been
made by both parties to refer to the principal Appel~ant os
Mrs. Sandberg.
It should be noted, however, that rerere:nc
to the Sandberg deposition apply to the deposition of '..'a:ll::
Kurt.
2
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after having taken the matter under advisement, the court, on March
24, 1977, signed an ORDER denying Appellants' motion, granting

t\espondent' s Motion, ordering specific performance by Appellants
and directing Respondent to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (R. 357-359).
On April 7, 1977, Counsel for Respondent mailed to the Court
and to Appellants' counsel, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order and Judgment and Decree of Specific Performance (R.369-

385 and 386-391).

The Court signed the Findings and Conclusions

and the Judgment on April 11, (R.384, 391) and the same were entered
on April 19, 1977 (R. 369, 386).
Contrary to and inconsistent with Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, Appellants on April 15, 1977, filed general and
non-specific Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (R. 361) and noticed the Objections for hearing in Richfield,
Utah, on May 25, 1977.

On that same date, April 15th, Appellants

filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from the preliminary Order of the Court that was signed on March 24, 1977 (R. 363).
On May 24, 1977, the day before the hearing on the Objections
in Richfield, Appellants' counsel hand-delivered to Respondent's
counsel more particularized objections to the Findings and Conclusions (R. unnumbered but following page 396 and filed in the
Supreme Court on June 16, 1977).
~ichfield

The trial court, sitting in

on May 25, 1977, declined to consider Appellants' Objec-

tions because the Court concluded that it had been divested of
Jurisdiction as a result of the Notice of Appeal filed by the
~ppellants

on April 15, 1977.

On June 6, 1977, the trial court

- 3-
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signed an order to that effect (filed in the Utah Supreme Court

c·

June 20th, in File i:!l527~).
On June 3, 1977, Appellants filed a Motion for Order E::~eniJ Time in which to appeal from the Order and judgment and Decree 0 ~
Specific Performance entered on April 19th (unnumbered but filed~~
On June 6th, counsel ~o:

the Utah Supreme Court on June 16, 1977).

Respondent advised the Court by letter, with copy to Appellants'
counsel,

that he had no objection to the Court extending the appec.'.

time in accordance with the motion of Appellants' counsel.

On June

13th the trial court signed an Order Extending Time for Filing
Notice of Appeal

fr:~:

t:te

Order and Judgment and Decree of SpeciLc

Performance (filed in the Utah Supreme Court on June 20th in File
#15274).

On June 16th Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal from tr.e

Judgment entered on April 19th, 1977 (filed in the Utah Supreme
Court on June 20th in file J.!152 74).
PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITY
The Appellants have failed to perfect their appeal from the
final judgment of the court made on April 11th, and entered on
April 19, 1977, and from which they filed their second notice of
appeal.

Rather, Appellants, on page 2 of their brief under the

heading of "Di!>posi.tion in the Lower Court", assert that they are
appealing from the Order of March 25th.

The final judgment of t'ie

court entered on April 19th has not been addressed by
lants.

\pprl-

Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellants seek reversal of the Summary Judgment as set ~or,~
in the preliminary Order of March 25,

1977.

Respondent scc·::5
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1

Jffirmation of the Order of March 25th and the final Judgment
entered on April 19, 1977, the judgment which the Appellants do not
iddress in their brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the hearing on the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment,

the

parties affirmatively represented to the Court that the facts were
not in dispute and that the Court could decide the case as a matter
of law (T.5-8).
advisement,

After hearing argument and taking the matter under

the court made and entered 38 specific Findings of Fact

(R. 369-381).

It should be noted that in their brief of 103 pages

Appellants do not challenge specifically any single Finding of Fact
as either controverted or as not supported by the evidence.

Respond-

ent asserts that every Finding of Fact is amply supported by the
pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions and affidavits
on file herein and that those facts are uncontroverted.
Respondent respectfully submits that under these circumstances
the only facts that need be reviewed are those facts set forth in
the trial court's findings

(R. 369-381).

For this Court's convenience, it is noted that other than the
Findings entered by the trial court,

the best organized and most

concise and convenient recitation of the facts is set forth in
~espondent'

s unchallenged, unobjected to and uncontroverted Affi-

davit (R.337-348) and the documents referred to therein and attached
thereto as exhibits "A" through "U" (R. 294-336).
The trial court's Findings rather clearly set forth the operative facts.
.1

In view of the isolated facts selected and distorted

ar::;ument by Appellants, Respondent feels compelled to restate

-5-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the material facts in a rnore orderly and less argurnentati'.'e fashi:·
as follows:
On April 4, 1962, Wayne Sandberg and Wanda Sandberg entered
into an Earnest

t~ney

Receipt (Finding #2 R.370, R. 294)

Respondent, Robert D. Klein, a right to purchase certain properties
in Washington County, Utah.

The original time period during

1-ll:ic~

Respondent had to convert the Earnest Money Receipt to an option
was extended.

On September 21, 1964,

(after the death of Hayne

Sandberg) Wanda Sandberg, in her individual capacity and in her
capacity as the legal representative of Wayne Sandberg, and
Respondent entered in;::a the Option Agreement anticipated by the
Earnest Money Receipt (Finding {,!5 R. 371, R. 298).
Pursuant to the Earnest Money Receipt and the Option Agreernent, Respondent made the following payments to Mrs. Sandberg (Fir.c·
ing #10 R.372, Klein Affidavit #12 R339):
June 14,
December
June 14,
December
June 14,
December
June 14,
December
June 14,
December
June 14,
December
June 14,
December
June 14,
December
June 14,
December

1962
14, 1962
1963
14, 1963
1964
14, 1964
1965
14, 1965
1966
14, 1966
196 7
14, 1967
1968
14, 1968
1969
14, 1969
1970
14, 1970

$

500.00
500.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00

$17,000.00

June 7, 1971 (down payment to
commence June 15, 1971 agreement)
TOTAL

2,000.00
$19,000.00
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On March 30, 1971, Respondent delivered a letter to Mrs.
Sandberg expressing his intention to exercise the option.

In that

letter he proposed a slight change in the property description,
referred to a requested survey, and indicated that he would on or
before June 15, 1971, make a down payment of $2,000.00 cash which
was required to exercise the option (Finding #9 R.372, R.305-307).
Wanda Sandberg received the letter (Finding #9 R.372, Sandberg
Answers to Request for Admissions #8 R.133-134).
The property is described in the Earnest Money Receipt and
Option Agreement by section numbers with a specific exclusion
therefrom of certain property lying
identified fence.

east of an established and

Mrs. Sandberg and Respondent walked the fence

together and established the fence as the east

boundary of the

property being sold in accordance with the terms of the agreements
(Finding #28 R.378, Sandberg Deposition 14-15, Klein Affidavit #22
R.343).

The fence meandered and a survey was required to establish

the precise location thereof to make possible the computation of
the acreage and the purchase price (Finding #13 R.373 Finding #28
1

R.373, Finding #15, R.340, Klein Affidavit #22 R.343, #15 R.340,

#17 R.340, Stevens Affidavit #4 R.26, Sandberg Deposition 13).
Thereafter, and during the first week in April, 1971, Mrs. Sandberg
and Respondent met with Howard Stevens, a professional surveyor.
~ey discussed a survey for purposes of determining the location of

the fence and the computation of the acreage and for purposes of
preparing a plat for annexation of the Sandberg property to the
City of St.
i~O.

George.

(Finding #13 R.373, Klein Affidavit jf15

Stevens Affidavit R.263).

Mrs. Sandberg agreed to the
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--survey and agreed to pay one-half (1/2) of the cost thereof
(Finding #13 R.374, Klein Affidavit ~15 R.340, Stevens Affidavi:
R.264).

At a subsequent ceeting with Respondent and the

Mrs. Sandberg, for

econo~ic

surveyo~

reasons, requested that the survev ce

delayed to near the time when she would be receiving the first
annual payment (June, 1972), and Respondent acquiesced therein
(Finding #16 R.375, Klein Affidavit #18 R.341, Stevens Affidavit
R. 264).

The survey was delayed as an acco;?,odation to Mrs. Sandbe::

Consequently, the completion and execution of the Real Estate
purchase Contract was delayed because an appropriate legal description excluding the land east of the meandering fence could
not be obtained and the acreage being sold and the purchase price
could not be determined without the survey (Finding #28 R.378,
Klein Affidavit #15 R.340, Sandberg Deposition 12-13).
Notwithstanding that the Real Estate Purchase Contract had
not been concluded, Respondent on June 7, 1971, delivered to :·!-:-s.
Sandberg a check in the amount of $2,000.00 with an endorsement
on the face thereof to the effect that it constituted a "down
payment to cormnence June 15 agreement, 1971" (Finding {;11 R. 373,
Klein Affidavit #13 R. 339, R. 308-309).
and cashed the check.

Mrs. Sandberg accepted

At that same tine, Mrs. Sandberg conveyed

to Respondent a parcel of 40 acres (Finding #14 R.374, Klein
Affidavit #15 R.340, R.311), which conveyance was pursuant to the

-8-
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:2lease provisions set forth in the Option Agreement,--1/the
cerms of which were to be embodied in the Real Estate Purchase
Contract (R. 300).
llrs. Sandberg and Respondent met with the St. George Planning
~JrJ:lission

with respect to the annexation.

At that meeting, 11rs.

S:ndberg represented that Respondent was purchasing the property
1 ~inding #12 R.373, Klein Affidavit #14 R.340).

An annexation plat

·.. as prepared and executed by l1rs. Sandberg and Respondent and
a?proved by the City of St. George.

The plat annexed to the City

of St. George not only property being purchased by Respondent, but
contiguous property East of the meandering fence being retained by
::rs. Sandberg (R.109).
On June 7, 1971, Mrs. Sandberg and Respondent met with the
·.:ashington County Commission and requested establishment of a
S'Jrvey monument which would reduce the cost of the survey (Finding
15 R. 374, Klein Affidavit jfl7 R. 340).

0

The Washington County

Co:;m1ission agreed to have the survey monument established (Finding
'15 R. 374, Klein Affidavit #17 R. 341,

R.312).

The Respondent paid

ell of the costs incident to the annexation and a nominal fee
c~arged
~onument

'!

by the County Commission for the establishment of a survey
(Finding #36 R.380, Klein Affidavit #17 R.341, R.313).

Respondent calculated in his letter of !>larch 30th that under
the terms of the release provisions in the Option Agreement he
would be entitled to a release and conveyance to him of 55
acres upon exercise and the payment of the cash down payment
of $2,000.00 required to exercise the Option.
Respondent did
not insist upon the conveyance of the other 15 acres because
he was uncertain at that time of which 15 acres he wanted
released and conveyed.
(Klein Deposition p.9).
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In April of 1972, Respondent approached Mrs. Sandberg about
the survey and she then for the first time refused to discuss the
matter with Respondent (Finding #17 R.375, Klein Affidavit Jl9
R. 342).

Respondent authorized the surveyor to proceed and Respor,,1-

ent paid for the cost of the survey (Finding #17 R.375, Klein
Affidavit #19 R.342).
Respondent received a letter dated April 20, 1972, from Appellants' counsel (Royal K. Hunt) wherein he asserted that Respondent
had exercised the option as to only 40 acres and had not paid the
$1,000.00 required in December of 1971, and that because thereof
the option was not in good standing and was terminated.

Counsel

for Appellants did not then assert any other reason for their
refusal to proceed (R.314).
On or about lfay 12, the surveyor completed the survey and
I

provided a legal description of those sections being sold to Responc-1
ent which description excluded all of the property east of the
fence (Finding #20 R.376, Klein Affidavit #22 R.342, R.264, 319,
320, 321, 328, 335).

The survey and the descriptions completed

and

prepared by the surveyor were transmitted to Mrs. Sandberg on or
about May 16, 1972 (Finding #21 R.377, R.322).
On or about May 16, 1972, Respondent prepared, executed and
transmitted to Mrs. Sandberg a Real Estate Purchase Contract (R.J:which contract used the description prepared by the surveyor.

T11 E

Real Estate Purchase Contract was consistent with all of the maten'.
terms and conditions of the sale set forth in the Earnest Monev
Receipt and the Option Agreement, including the legal descrirtio~s
of the property according to the parties' understanding t 11c1·eof •
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Lhc consideration to be paid therefor (Finding #37 R.380).

On or

about June 1, 1972, Respondent tendered to Mrs. Sandberg a Cashier's Check in the amount of $8,624.8Lf which was the calculated
first annual installment required to be made under the terms of the
Option Agreement and the Real Estate Purchase Contract (Finding #22
R.377, R.329, 330).

Mrs. Sandberg received the tendered check and

returned the same to Respondent (Finding #22 R.377, Klein Affidavit
J24 R.343, Sandberg Deposition P.35).
On or about June 13, 1972, Respondent addressed a letter to
Mrs. Sandberg and enclosed with that letter a Cashier's Check in
lhe amount of $68,359.94, in full payment of the balance due under
the Option (Finding #23, R.377, Klein Affidavit #25 R.343, R.331,
332).

On July 11, 1972, Appellants' counsel returned the Cashier's

Check in the amount of $68, 359. 94 to Respondent's counsel (Finding
#24 R.378, Klein Affidavit #27 R.344, R.336).
The Option Agreement did not specify who was to prepare the
Real Estate Purchase Contract.

Respondent took the initiative and

prepared the same, but preparation was delayed because of Mrs.
Sandberg's expressed desire to delay survey expenses (Finding #16
R.375, Finding #29 F.379, Finding #34 R.380, Klein Affidavit #18
R.341, Stevens Affidavit R.264, Klein Deposition P.14-15).

Mrs.

Sandberg has never specifically objected to any of the terms and
2onditions set forth in the Real Estate Purchase Contract prepared
by Respondent, nor has she ever objected to the real property
~escription
0

.3805).

prepared by the surveyor, Howard Stevens (Finding #35

tlrs. Sandberg, after December of 1971, represented to

,ird parties that Respondent had purchased the property (Finding
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#36 R.380 Sandberg Deposition P.51-52).

Prior to exercising the

option, Respondent paid and Mrs. Sandberg received and accepted
$17,000.00.

At the time of exercise, June 7, 1971, Respondl'nt
Rcspo~,.~.

paid and Mrs. Sandberg accepted a $2,000.00 dow'Tl payment.

ent expended time, energy and money in having a survey monuli'.cnt
established, having the property annexed to the City of St. Geor;::c:,
and in having the property surveyed, all in reliance on his havin;
exercised the option and in reliance upon Mrs. Sandberg 1 s ackno11lec:·
ment thereof (Finding if37 R. 380).

Mrs. Sandberg repeatedly ackno·,;-

ledged and confirmed the existence of the option and Respondent's
interest in the

Fr')?Cl"C/

and accepted through June of 1971, withoc.::

objection, Respondent's timely payments of all amounts due in
connection with the transaction (Finding #38 R.380).
On April 8, 1974, Appellants filed this action in the Distric:
Court in and for Washington County, State of Utah (R. 1).

In their

Complaint, Appellants affirmatively allege that Wanda Sandberg and
Wayne Sandberg granted to Respondent an option to purchase the
subject property (R.3 1f10).

The subject property described in the

Complaint is the same property described in the Earnest :·!oney
Receipt and is identical to the survey description prepared by the
surveyor (Finding #20 R.376, Klein Affidavit #22 R.342, R.2, 3,
R.328), which is also the identical description included in the
Real Estate Purchase Contract prepared and executed by Respondent
(R.324-328), and is the property for which Respondent seeks
ific performance of the Option Agreement.

-12-
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soec-

POINTS I AND II
STANDARDS FOR AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Respondent has no quarrel with the section of Appellants'
~rief

dealing with the scope of judicial review in this case.

It

is well established in Utah that the Supreme Court may review the
facts as well as the law in equity cases before it.

However,

Appellants' inference on pages 22-23 of their brief that summary
judgment was inappropriate in this easel/ is directly contrary to
the representations of Appellants' counsel before the trial court.
At the hearing on the cross Motions for Summary Judgment on
>larch 15, 1977, the trial court engaged counsel in a penetrating
colloquy respecting the advisability of deciding this case on
Summary Judgment.

The trial court stated:

Okay, I don't want you to dodge around because I am going to tie you down right now.
What I am saying is that' are you prepared
do you want to argue this on a Motion for
Summary Judgment or are you prepared to
stipulate that this case may be submitted
to the Court as a question of law based upon
your statement of facts as set forth in your
Motion for Summary Judgment?
(T.6).
This question was particularly important since trial in the matter
~as calendared just two weeks hence on March 28,

1977.

After

counsel for all parties stipulated that the matter would be dis-

J./

In their brief at pages 22-23, Appellants state:
"It is incredible that the lower court could find,
before one witness had taken the stand, that the evidence in
the file considered favorably to the Appellants met the high
evidentiary standard required to support a decree for specific
performance in favor of the Respondent

-13-
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posed of by Motion for Summary Judgment,

the Court stated further

All right, the record should indicate that
both sides have stipulated -- now, listen
to me, gentlemen, I think there should be
no question about why we are here and what
vou have done.
The record should indicate
~hat both parties have made a Motion for
Summary Judgment and the Court has advised
counsel that if there's a question of
law[sic] that the Court felt that the
Motions for Surrunary Judgment should be
continued till the time of trial, which was
on March 28th.
Both parties stipulate
there was no issue of fact, subject that
the Affidavit filed this morning would be
considered as part of the fact.
MR. COWLEY:
THE

CO[~!

Uncontroverted.
~~controverted

fact.
So
it appears to the Court that
this case can be submitted to the Court on
the issue of law, period, and the Court
will find -- make a decision based on the
law in this case.
conseq~ently

MR. CO\.JLEY:

We so understand, your Honor.

MR. THOMPSON:
We so understand and we so
stipulate.
(T. 7).
The propriety of the disposition of this case by means of
Motions for Surrunary Judgment is something that Appellants should
not now be heard to raise on appeal, even inferentially.
While Appellants suggest that the Findings entered by the
trial court do not reflect the facts,

they do not in their brief of

103 pages specifically challenge any single particular Finding as
either controverted or as unsubstantiated by the record.

Nor do

they in their brief even make reference to the Findings of the
trial court.

That the facts in this case are not in dispute is

further evidenced by Appellants' argument at pages 18-19 of their

-14-
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brief that this case should not be remanded for any reason, but
that this Court should make new Findings and enter judgment for
rhem.

Respondent submits that if the Findings of the trial court

~ere unreflective of the facts,

Appellants would have found room in

cheir 103 page brief to specifically point out the claimed inconsistencies.

Without even a single specific challenge to any one

of the Findings of the trial court,

this Court has no good reason

to now look behind those Findings.

Each of the authorities cited

by Appellants for the proposition that the Supreme Court in equity

cases can make Findings and enter judgment is a case in which
specific challenges were made to the Findings of the trial court.
Appellants have cited no authorities in which the Supreme Court has
disturbed the Findings of the lower court when Appellants have made
no specific objections to the Findings.

With no specific challenge

to the Findings, this Court should concern itself only with the
legal issues, notwithstanding its power to review the facts in
equity cases.
POINT III
RESPONDENT HAS MET THE STANDARDS
OF PROOF NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORl-f..ANCE
Point III of Appellants' brief is merely a statement of the
evidentiary standard that must be met in order to support a decree
~or specific performance.

Respondent does not disagree with the

1uoted proposition in Appellants' brief that specific performance
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requires a contract that is
free from doubt, vagueness and ambiquity
and that it must be sufficiently certain
and definite in its terms to leave no
reasonable doubt as to what the parties
intended,
Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18
Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491, 493 (1963).
and
The evidence of the making of the contract
must be clear and convincing, or as stated
in some cases, clear, cogent and convincing,
or strong and conclusive.
71 Arn.Jur. 2d
Specific Performance §208 (1973).
/.,'

Appellants urged this same standard on the trial court belo1.'-' '
and the trial court had the standard in mind when it decided the
case and entered
and

~he

j~d~~e~t

against Appellants.

The record herein

unchallenged Findings of Fact clearly demonstrate that the

burden of proof necessary to support the Order of March 15th and
the Order and Judgment and Decree of Specific Performance entered
on April 19th has been clearly met.
POINT IV
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT A DEFENSE
Appellants suggest, for the first time on this appeal, that
since Mrs. Sandberg refused to execute the Real Estate Purchase
Contract (the very performance sought by Respondent and ordered ~
the lower court) that the statute of frauds relieves them from
their contractual duty to perform their prior written and executec

_.!!_/

In their Memorandum (R.173) and Amended Memorandum (R.215) .
filed in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Appel-,_
lanes argued that the Option Agreement in question was. vo~cJJ~'
as un~uly vague and ambiguous, that the option was untin;eiv ,, .
ex~rcised, ~nd that the option expired by its own terrs ..-:ith ·
being exercised as to the property in question.
The trial .
court specifically found against Appellants on these n~a:tc::··
(R.358,
378, 379).
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1greements.

The inherent defect in such an argument make it

"wrthy of little comment.
First, it is axomatic that the Supreme Court will not consider
an issue which was not considered by the court below and which is
r1ised for the first time on appeal.

Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson,

29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P. 2d 528 (197 3); State By and Through Road Commission v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972); Wagner v.
Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1970); In re Ekker's Estate,
19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d

358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967).

At no time in the proceedings before the

lower court did Appellants raise any issue respecting the statute
of frauds.

Based on the above cited authorities, this Court should

not now consider an issue which was neither mentioned nor considered
by the lower court.

Second, even if the issue is considered by this Court, the
statute of frauds does not apply to the circumstances presented by
this case.

This is not a case in which Respondent is seeking to

enforce an oral agreement to convey land.
case have all been written.

The agreements in this

Wayne and Wanda Sandberg executed the

Earnest Money Receipt (Finding #2 R.370), Mrs. Wanda Sandberg
executed the Option Agreement (Finding #5 R.371).
~ere

Both agreements

in writing and both agreements contemplated the sale and

:ransfer of the real property in question.

The preparation and

exeuction of the Real Estate Purchase Contract was delayed, as an
0 ccomodation

to Mrs. Sandberg, but it merely embodied the terms of

:\e prior written and executed agreements (Findings {/21, 29 R. 377,

.;9).
''Cc>

A written agreement was present at every step of the conveyof real property in this case.

By its very terms,

the statute
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of frJ.uds,

l'.tJ.h Code Ann.

§25-5-1 (1953),

Joes not a?pl:.· to ::'.ec

facts of this case because of the •.,Titings that are ur:dis?uL1:,:
part of the record.
Third, even if the contract in question were an oral
ment, the statute of frauds '"'ould a\·ail Appellants nothing

a~ree-

bcc:i1~se

the Joctrine of part performance would take this case out of the

51
ds . purview ot- the statute o f trau

Utah Code Ann.

§25-5-8 (195:;;

states:
Nothing in this chapter [statute of frauds]
containcc shall be construed to abridge the
po~er~ -~ c.~r:s to compel the specific perfor~ance :~ aireements in case of part perfor23~ce

_21

=~e~eof.

The doctrine of part performance in Utah is explained in
detail in Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Companv, 6 Utah 2d
18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956).
While it is not necessary to apply
this doctrine here because of the acknowledged writings, t!1e
undisputed facts of this case would meet the requirements for
the operation of the doctrine as set forth by the court in
Randall:
The Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annota:2:
(1953) requires promises to convey interests in land to
be in writing; but Section 25-5-8 allows part perforT":ance
to remove an oral contract from the Statute.
The essence
of the Utah doctrine of part performance is found in
three cases:
Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Utah 480, 33 P.218
Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P.767, 8 L.R.A.N.S., 870
and Van Natta v. Heywood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192.
Excluding the problem of value of services, three generJ!
criteria emerge in removing an oral contract from the ,
Statute of Frauds by part performance.
First, the ora.
contract and its terms must be clear and definite; secc·~.
the acts done in performance of the contract must be
equally clear and definite; and third, the acts must b 2
in reliance on the contract.
Such acts in reliance Gus:
be such that a) they would not have been performed ~ad
the contract not existed, and b) the failure to er:J~
on ~he part of the promiser would result in frau on :~e
per~ormer who relied, since dar..ages ·.:ould be ina ··· ·_i'O'..
Relinace may be made in innucerable wavs, all of
1c~
could refer exclusively to the contrac~.
Id. at
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" .. Jisputcd fdcts in this case clearly establish part performance
:·;rs. Sandberg and Respondent.

J

Lc~dered

On June 7, 1971, Respondent

a down payment to Mrs. Sandberg which was accepted and

cashed (Finding #11 R.373).

Pursuant to the release provisions

2i the option, which provisions were, upon Respondent's exercise thereof,

to be embodied in the contract, Mrs.

Sandberg

::".ade a partial conveyance of the property to Respondent on June
1,

1971 (Finding #14 R.374).

~Jpellants

In reliance on the agreement of

to convey the property, Respondent made substantial

Jayments over the years which were accepted; Respondent expended
::~e.

~~

energy and money in having a survey monument established

in having the property annexed to the City of St. George;

~cspondent
~al

had the property surveyed; and Respondent had the

Estate Sales Contract prepared.

Partial performance by

J2th parties bars a statute of frauds defense.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants' arguments relating
the statute of frauds should be dismissed as irrelevant.
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POfoT V
THE OPTIO:J AGREE'.!ENT IS CLEAR A'.'JD
UNA:rnrcuous ..1.::D C..\P1'..l3LE OF SPECIFIC PE!ZFOR:·!Ai~CE
a.

Contracts Exoressl· L12avinz Material Terms to Future
Contractua Agreement are Cncnforceable.
Respondent finds it unnecessary to disagree with the leng

and learned dissertation set forth under this heading on pages 32
through 41 of Appellants' brief.

It is noted that Appellants do

not attempt to apply the law as stated to the facts in this case.
It is suggested that their failure to do so is because the law as
stated is not applicable to the facts at hand.

The Option Agree-

ment (R.298-302) contains every essential, material term and
leaves no te::cns ::o ;:·_:.ture agreement as is readily obvious from ever.
a cursory reading of the document in question.
b.

The 0 tion Agreement was not an A reement to Agree but is
a C ear, Unambiguous and Complete Agreement.
The essence of Appellants' argument beginning on page 41 of

their brief is that before the option could be exercised, a further
agreement of the parties as to the amount of land being purchased
was necessary, as well as future agreement as to the amount of

~~

payment and as to the choice of lands to be released to Respondent
after the down payment was made.

In each instance cited by Appel-

lants, the claimed necessity for future agreement is an al ternatire
to a definite, fixed provision.

That is the down payment, for

example, is agreed to be $2,000.00, unless the parties mutuallY
agree to something different.

In the absence of a mutual agreeme:;:

changing the fixed provision, the specific provision would bind t~i
parties.
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On page 40 of their brief, Appellants state:

"there is author-

ity which seems to suggest that even leaving future agreement as an
Jlternative to specified terms may result in a contract being found
unenforceable."

Appellants, however,

fail to cite a single author-

ity that suggests anything of the sort.

In this respect, Appel-

lants cite Kline v. Rogerson, 181 P.2d 385 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1947) for the proposition that providing for a future agreement
only as an alternative renders a contract void.

The holding of

that case does not even approximate such a proposition.

The court

in Kline v. Rogerson stated the following as the sole issue for
determination:

"Was plaintiff the owner or holder of the check

executed by defendant?"

Contrary to Appellants' representation

that the general phrase "or terms to mutual satisfaction" following
very specific terms rendered the contract void,

the specific terms

of the contract were unenforceable simply because defendant had not
signed the contract which meant he had not agreed to the specific
terms.
One of the paragraphs of the Option upon which Appellants rely
in support of their proposition that further agreement is required
is Paragraph 5:

"The Buyer may exercise his right to purchase
this property for the sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per acre at any time during
the option period, (including any extension
period) by executing a contract to purchase
all or such part or parts of the property
as the parties may agree; such contract to
purchase shall provide as follow:
(R.300, Paragraph 5).
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It is submitted that the only reasonable interpretation of th~
paragraph is that (1) Responucnt may exercise the option as to all
of the property, or (2) Respondent may exercise as to a part or
parts of the property as the parties may agree.
The interpretation contended for by Appellants is an attempt
to torture rather clear language into an ambiguity.

Taking Appel-

lants interpretation, the result is that whenever the optionee
attempted to exercise, he must first obtain the further agreement
of the optionor.

It is absurd to believe that over a nine year

period Respondent paid and Appellants accepted 19 payments totaling
$19, 000. 00 under c i:c ~·..::::stances where such payments would buy nothing for Respondent except as may thereafter be agreed to by
Appellants. It is totally unreasonable to believe that such was the
intention of the parties.
There are several well established rules of construction that
operate in this case to sustain the trial court's interpretation of
the option as unambiguous.

First, a construction giving an instru-

ment legal effect to accomplish its purpose will be adopted when it
can reasonably be done, and between two possible constructions, the
construction that will establish a valid contract should be adopted.

Frailey v. McGar_£Y, 116 Utah 504, 211 P.2d 840,

847 (1949);

Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 2d 417,
142 P.2d 657, 663 (1943).
Second, if uncertainty exists as to the interpretation of a
contract, the court will endeavor to give the contract a rational
and just construction.

Continental Bank

-22-
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L'cah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890, 893 (1955).

While

Respondent denies

that the option in question is uncertain in any respect, it is both
·Jnj us t and unreasonable to assume, as Appellants contend in this

case,

that the parties intended that Respondent should pay Appel-

lant $19,000.00 over a nine year period and then only have the
right to ask Appellants to agree to something.

Without doubt,

the

parties always intended that the option covered all the land in
certain described sections, excluding therefrom only certain land
lying east of a meandering fence.
Third, if a contract contains general and special provisions
relating to the same thing,
1

the specific provisions control. Desbien

v. Penokee Farmers Union Co-Op, Ass'n.,

552 P.2d 917, 923 (Kan. 1976);

West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co .. , 536 P.2d 393, 397 (Okl.App. 1974);
~yburn

v.

v. Vernier,

Crawford, 187 Or. 386, 211 P.2d 483, 488 (1949); Crecente
53 N.M. 188, 204 P.2d 785,

Firestone Tire

& Rubber

790-91 (1949); Morgan v.

Co., 68 Idaho 506, 201 P.2d 976, 983 (1948);

Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Markham, 106 Colo.
313, 316 (1940).

509, 107 P. 2d

Each provision of the contract cited by Appellants

in their arguments that future agreement was required contains a
specific provision followed by the phrase which indicates that
other arrangements might be made by mutual agreement.
ooove cited authorities,
~neral

Based on the

the specific provisions prevail over the

provisions.

Fourth, a contract is to be construed so as to give it meaning
intended by the parties, and courts will not resort to grammatical
'iceties or technicalities of punctuation unless they may be util-
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ized to make plain that which is otherwise obscure.
Weil, 75 N.M. 562, 408 P.2d 140 (1965).
Fifth, equity will not allow Appellants to accept the
benefits of an agreement for some nine years and receive and
accept some $19,000.00 and then resort to sophistry and arguments to avoid their obligations under the option.

This Court

in \\oulsey v. Brown, 539 P. 2d 1035 (Utah 1975) stated:
Equity will not permit a party to accept
performance for many years and then claim
terms contrary to the evidence, as a basis
to substantiate an assertion of indefiniteness, and thus avoid specific performance.
Id. at 1039.
The evidence suppc1-rs the trial court's determination that the
parties had agreed to sell the property and no future agreement
was necessary.
Respondent's letter of I-larch 30, 1971 (R. 305) addressed to
Mrs. Sandberg makes it clear that he will exercise his rights
with respect to all the property.

The Option Agreement described

land in certain sections and then excluded therefrom land lying
east of an identified and established fence.
Mrs. Sandberg testified in her deposition that she and
Respondent "walked out on the fence and that at that time she
was insisting that the meandering fence was the boundary of the
property she was selling, and that Respondent agreed thereto
(Sandberg depostion p.14-15).

Mrs. Sandberg represented to the

St. George Planing ComI'.1ission in April and :·lay 1971 that R12spo:iJent was purchasing the property.

Mrs. Sandberg on June 7th,

1971 accepted the $2,000 down payment.

Respondent, in his
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l~tLer of March 30th set forth the calculations showing his entitle~ent

to a release of 55 acres pursuant to the terms of the Option

Asreement.

Mrs. Sandberg, on June 7th, 1971, conveyed 40 acres.

Respondent did not require the conveyance of the other fifteen
acres at that time because he was uncertain as to which other 15
acres he wished released (Klein Deposition Page 9).

More than 7

;:;onths after the June 7th payment, and after December, 1971, i-!rs.
Sandberg represented to third persons that Respondent had purchased
the property (Sandberg Deposition P. 51-52). _§_I

The trial court

found that the Option Agreement of Sept. 21, 1964, was not vague or
ambiguous and not an agreement to agree (Finding #32 R.379).
It is obvious from the above-referenced evidence considered by
the trial court that the parties always intended that the option
covered all the land in certain described sections, excluding
therefrom only certain land lying east of a meandering fence and
that the description prepared by the surveyor and annexed to the
Real Estate Purchase Agreement properly described the land under
option.
The most telling and conclusive evidence of Appellants' understanding and intent, however, is found in Appellants' Complaint
(R. 1) .

In Paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Appellants describe the

real property which is the subject of the action.

ii

The description

These representations to third persons after December, 1971,
that Respondent had purchased the property are significant
because of a letter sent to Respondent in April of 1972 by
counsel for Mrs. Sandberg to the effect that the option had
terminated because Respondent failed to make an option payment
in December, 1971.
Respondent did not make the December,
1971, payment to keep the option alive because the option had
been exercised.
The statements by Mrs. Sandberg subsequent to
December, 1971, that Respondent had purchased the property,
,
show that she, too, understood this to be the case and counsel s
April, 1972, letter was nothing more than a feeble attempt to
undue something
that
was Funding
otherwise
cast
in cement.
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is identical in every respect to the description prepared by the
surveyor and with respect to ~hich the Rcs?ondent seeks specific
performance.

It is the same property that is described in the

Earnest Money Receipt.

In Paragraph 10 of their Complaint (R. 3)

the Appellants affirmatively allege that they granted to the Respon:'·
ent "an option to purchase the subject property."

In answer to the

Complaint, Respondent admitted the allegations of Paragraphs 8 and
10 thereof (R. 7).

Furthermore, Appellants did not raise the issue

ir. their Motion or in their
is sug;ested

~~~t

~femorandum

by such pleading,

or Amended Memorandum.

It

the description of the property

covered by the option is not in issue.
Because of the conduct of rfrs.

Sandberg and because of the

allegations in the Complaint, Respondent has labored under the
impression that there has never been any doubt or controversy as to
the description of the real property covered by the option and for
which Respondent seeks specific performance.

It is respectfully

submitted that the attempt to obsfucate the real intentions and
agreement of the parties, through a confusing rehash of selected
and distorted statements and facts and through a tortured interpretation thereof, must fail.
On pages 45 and 46 of their brief, Appellants suggest that the
language in the option with respect to the release provision and
the down payment require mutual future agreement.

Based upon the

authorities cited above which discuss the rules of construction,
applicable to these circumstances, Appellants' argument of "mutual
future agreement" is without merit.

-26-

It is also submitted that a
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reasonable reading of the Option Agreement (R.298) will disabuse
the Court of any such notions.
On pages 47-49 of their brief ,Appellants quote out of context
some portions of Respondent's letter to Mrs. Sandberg of March 30,
~971,

and assert that said letter is an acknowledgement that further

future agreement was required.
As the record shows,

This contention is simply erroneous.

the letter indicates some interest and inquiry

by Respondent to get away from the meandering fence

(R.305-307).

A

review of the letter and the circumstances under which it was
written demonstrate that Respondent was proposing some slight
modifications to the real property description.
however,

Mrs. Sandberg,

insisted upon her contract right that the meandering fence

was the east boundary of the property being sold (Sandberg Deposition P.14-15).

Following Mrs. Sandberg's rejection of Respond-

ent's proposals, Respondent then proceeded to obtain the legal
description originally agreed upon by the parties by retaining a
professional surveyor, Howard Stevens, to complete the survey and
calculate the acreage of the property in the described sections,
excluding that lying east of the fence.

The record fails to reveal

that Mrs. Sandberg ever objected to the description proposed by the
surveyor.
The Appellants, try as they will, can take little comfort from
)avison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973) and other
cases cited by them.
~ds

In Davison and the other cases cited, there

not an actual defined description of the property within the

3ocuments.

In this case,

the description is set out by sections
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(excluding property east of an established and identified fenc~;
The property which is the s•-.1bject of the option is clearl:i cu.pu.blc
of identification.
survey.

It was identified in the docu~ents and by the

Appellants understanding and agreement thereto is evide,,c .. ,

by their Complaint wherein they affirmatively allege and describe
the particular property optioned to Respondent.
c.

The Option Agreement is Complete.

On page 52 of their brief, Appellants contend that the Option
Agreement was not complete because "Schedule A", an exhibit des-

7/

cribing the property was to be attached.~

It is true that such

an exhibit was never prepared nor attached.

However,

Money Receipt and

~he

the Earnest

Option Agreement contained specific des-

criptions by section numbers and excluded therefrom certain land
lying east of an identified and established fence.
said that because Schedule A was not attached,

It cannot be

the parties had not

agreed to the description of the lands being purchased.

The only

thing that could be accomplished by attaching the exhibit would be
to define the fence line.
Mrs. Sandberg accepted payments over a seven year period
without complaining about the absence of the exhibit.

Mrs. Sandberg.

and Respondent walked the fence line in the Spring of 1971.

Mrs.

Sandberg, in the Spring of 1971, agreed to a survey to establish a
metes and bounds description of the fence line and agreed to pay

_]_/

The option provided that the property was to be
· · · more particularly described in Schedule A attached
hereto, to be signed by the parties and made part hereor
for all purposes.
(R.60).
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c':ie-h~lf

of the cost thereof. i·:rs. Sandberg, requested a delay of

che survey and Respondent agreed to such request.
19~1.

On June 7,

:irs. Sandberg accepted the down payment of $2, 000. 00, pre-

~J~ably

with knowledge that the non-existent exhibit was not at-

:ached to the Option Agreement. Appellant represented to the St.

George Planning Commission and thereafter to third parties that she
Jad sold the property.

A survey was completed and an accurate

sJrvey description was prepared.

Appellants did not object thereto.

Finally, the Appellants made a non-issue of the description by
alleging in their Complaint that they had granted to Respondent an
option to acquire the property described in the Complaint.

The

?roperty described in the Complaint is the same property described
in the documents and surveyed by Howard Stevens, and is the property
for which Respondent seeks specific performance.
Deciding a specific performance case,

the court in King v.

Stanlev, 32 C.2d 584, 197 P.2d 321 .(1948) stated:
Equity does not require that all the terms and
conditions of the proposed agreement be set
forth in the contract.
The usual and reasonable conditions of such a contract are, in the
contemplation of the parties, a part of their
agreement.
In the absence of express conditions,
custom determines incidental matters relating
to the opening of an escrow, furnishing deeds,
title insurance policies, prorating of taxes,
and the like.
Janssen v. Davis, 219 Cal. 783,
788, 29 P.2d 196; Wagner v. Estathiw, 169 Cal.
663, 666, 147 P. 561; Bisno v. Herzberg, 75
Cal.App.2d 235, 241, 170 P.2d 973; O'Donnell v.
Lutter, 68 Cal.App.2d 376, 838, 156 P.2d 958.
The material factors to be ascertained from the
written contract are the seller, the buyer, the
price to be paid, the time and manner of payment,
and the property to be transferred, describing it
so it may be identified.
Breckinridge v. Crocker,
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supra, 78 Cal. 529, 21 P. 179; Grafton v. Cu:nr..ings
99 U.S. 100, 25 L.Ed. 366; O'Donnell v. Lutter,
suora, 68 Cal. A.pp.2d 376, 157 P.2d 958.
There is
no.question that these essential items were
clearly determinable here.
Id. at 324.
\Ji th respect to specific performance,

the court in Potter v.

Bland, 136 C.A.2d 125, 288 P.2d 569 (1955) stated:
Equity does not require that all the terms and
conditions of the proposed agreement be set
forth in the contract.
Id. at 573.
See also:

Martin v. Baird, 124 C.A.2d 598, 269 P.2d 54 (1954).

Likewi3e, this court in Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164
P.2d 893 (1946) helJ :hat a preliminary agreement for sale of an
apartment house was not so incomplete as to preclude specific
performance when the essential terms of the contract were ascertainable and were capable of being made certain by extrinsic, parol
or documentary evidence.

This court stated:

It is elementary that in equity that is certain which can be made certain.
In case
certain lands are mentioned by name merely
in a contract, without giving a definite
description, the lands intended in the contract may always be shown by extrinsic, parol
or documentary evidence.
See also Pomeroy's
Specific Performance of Contracts, 3rd Ed.
Sec. 152.
Id. at 895.
Appellants cannot claim that any of the essential terms of the
option are missing, nor can they contend that the option is incomplete in any particular essential to its enforcement.

While the

document was not completed by the attachment of the exhibit, there
is absolutely no doubt or controversy with respect to the intentions of the parties.

It would be inequitable to permit Appellants

to have the fruits of their bargain for some seven years and tn

-30-
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\

Jcny Respondent his rights because of the absence of a simple
c:.;hibit which, under the existing facts, would neither add to nor
detract from the contract between the parties.
POINT VI
TiiE LAUD DESCRIPTION IS NOT
AMBIGUOUS AND CONTRADICTORY
On pages 53-63 of their brief, Appellants engage in a series
of suppositional and mythical diagrams that are not in the record
which they claim support the proposition that the land description
is ambiguous and contradictory.

If Appellants' suppositions and

speculations are intended to confuse rather than clarify, they have
succeeded.

Their bald assertions and speculative diagrams are not

supported by the record.

Therefore,

the only sensible response

•.·1ithin the reasonable limitation of this brief is to say that "it
isn't so" and to then state facts that are supported by the record.
The facts in the record and the· reasonable inferences to be drawn
' therefrom clearly demonstrate that there is no amgibuity or contradiction with respect to the land description in this case.
Prior to any discussion of this issue raised by Appellants the
Court should note tuo important things.

First, at no time in the

proceedings before the trial court did Appellants raise any issue
respecting an ambiguous and contradictory land description.

This

' ~urt has always held, without exception, that it will not consider
an issue which was not considered by the court below and which is
:aised for the first time on appeal.
29 Utah 2d 259,
_i:;sion v.

Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson,

508 P. 2d 528 (1973); State By and Through Road Com-

Lukin,

27 Utah 2d 295,

495 P.2d 817 (1972); Wagner v.
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Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1970);

In re Ekker's Estnte,

19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967; Riter v. Cavias, 19 l!tah 2d 353,
431 P.2d 788 (1967).
Second, the land description is a non-issue.

In their Com-

plaint Appellants affirmatively allege that they granted to Res~ond
ent an opti0n on the property specifically described in their
Cornplaint--the same property for which Respondent seeks specific
performance.

This affirmative acknmvledgrnent by Appellants of the

land under option should be dispositive of the controversy over
description.

Appellants should not be allowed, for the first time

on appeal, to raise an issue that controverts their own pleadings
in the case.
Notwithstanding the foregoing,

it is considered necessary in

view of the confusion created by Appellants' brief to comment
further.
The Earnest Money Agreement of April, 1962 (R.294),

describes

the optioned property as follows:
All land owned by the sellers in
Sections 21, 22 and 27, 7ownship 42
South, Range 15 West, S.L.M., consisting,
so far as the parties can determine at
this time of approximately 500 acres not
including any water or water rights, and less
the following:
There is now a reservoir constructed by the
City of St. George on what the parties
believe to be the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section
22, and there is an old fence running north
and south west of this reservoir.
The sellers
intend to reserve from said sale all land
in said Section 22 which lies east of said
fence line, it being understood that the
exact line will have to be determined if and
when the option hereinafter mention is
executed.
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The Option Agreement of September,

1964 (R.298), describes the

optioned property as follows:
. the Sellers do hereby ratify the
option granted to the Buyer on June 14,
1962, and which is hereby formally granted,
agreed to and acknowledged as an option to
purchase all land owned by the Sellers in
Section 21, Section 22, and Section 27 of
Township 42 South, Range 15 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, consisting of approximately
500 acres, which property shall be more particularly described in Schedule A attached hereto,
to be signed by the parties and made a part hereof
for all purposes; not including any water or
water rights, and excluding all land in the
Northeast one quarter of the Northeast one
quarter of Section 22, which lies East of the
old fence line, which runs North and Southwest
of the City of St. George reservoir, said
excluded property also to be more particularly
described in Schedule A attached hereto and made
a part hereof for all purposes.
The variance in the descriptions is that the Earnest Money
Keceipt excludes all land lying east of the fence in Section 22,
while the Option Agreement excludes the land lying east of the fence
in the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 22. It
now appears there was some land in both the Northeast quarter of the
~ortheast

1

~arter

quarter and in the Southeast quarter of the Northeast

of Section 22.

The literal difference, then, is that the

Earnest Money Receipt by excluding all property in Section 22 east
of the fence,

'

excluded a small parcel (approximately 30 acres) that

:~s

in the Southeast quarter of the Northeast quarter, which was

~t

excluded by the description in the Option Agreement.

~:ilphical

(See

illustration on page 33 (a)).

The now apparent variance in descriptions is explainable.
.·.~

E<lrnest Money Agreement,

In

the assumption and the statement are
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t

North
NE 1/4 SEC. L2

r
l

/&./ ~iji
40 a.

1320'

roperty of
Citv of
\.Jashington

Res.

SE 1/4
NE 1/4

40 a.
Only the Option
Agreement exclu-

I

~i

sion would not
have excludea
this approximate
30 acres in the
SE 1/4 NE 1/4

Property of City
of St. George

In summary,

(1) the Earnest Money Receipt (R.294), and
(2) the Survey (R. 321), and
(3) the Real Estate Purchase Contract

(R.324), and
(4) the Plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 1), and
(5) the Testimony of Sandberg (Sandberg
Deposition p .14-15), and
(6) the Testimony of Klein (Klein Affidavit
{f22 R.243)
all demonstrate that all property East of the fence in
Section 22, i.e., in both the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 and the
SE 1/4 NE 1/4 was to be excluded.

Only the unnoted scrivener's erroneous description in
the Option Agreement limited the exclusion to the
property East of the fence in the NE 1/4 NE 1/4.
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to the effect that the fence runs north and south at a location
that is west of an old reservoir that is located in what the
?arties believe to be the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter
of Section 22.

The property east of the fence is to be excluded.

The reasonable inference to be drawn is that the property being
excluded is in the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter.
\·Jhile not a part of the record,

it can be assumed that the scrivener

of the Option Agreement drew such an inference and provided for an
exclusion of that property lying east of the fence in the inferred
Iiortheast quarter of the Northeast quarter, apparently unaware, as
were the parties, that the fence actually extended into the Southeast
quarter of the Northeast quarter.
Agreement.

Both parties signed the Option

Apparently neither party detected the mechanical error

by the scrivener. Both parties during the period of September,
1964, to the filing of Appellants' brief with this Court proceeded
with the understanding that all property east of the fence was
excluded.

Payments were made and accepted through June of 1971

without any comment or objection.

Seven years after the execution

of the Option Agreement the parties walked the fence line together
in the Spring of 1971 and agreed that the fence consituted the east
boundary.

Appellants never objected to the description provided by

the surveyor.

Appellants filed their Complaint on April 8, 1974

and affirmatively alleged that they had granted an option to Respondent on specifically described real property, which description as
set forth in the Complaint excludes all property east of the fence.
llants. in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
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a

~lemorandum

and an 1\r.1ended 1lemorandur:i

neit~1er

of <.vhich cL1ir.1 :1n::

disagreement as to the property under option.
Relying on Appellants' Complaint and

pleadin~s

which estab-

lished that there was no issue with respect to the description of
the land under option, Respondent did not make a record in the
trial court with respect to the explanation of the apparent varianc1
After the adverse ruling by the trial court Appellant~ counsel
searched for and discovered and now assert a minor and previously
unrelied upon and explainable variance as an ambiguity and a contradiction and try to take comfort therein.

The record does not

indicate that the parties were aware of the variance.

The claim

that is now being made is a controversy created for the first time
by Appellants' counsel and not by the parties.

It is submitted

that the claim is without merit and is raised too late.
This Court in Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 92,

164 P.2d 893

(1946) decided a specific performance case in which

Appellant

claimed that the property description was uncertain and indefinite.
The Court rejected these claims and held that the description was
sufficiently definite and complete when considered in light of
Appellants own ans\ver in the case and the extrinsic and documentary
evidence.

The Court stated:
The claim that the preliminary agreement
is so incomplete and uncertain that an equity
court should not decree specific performance,
is based upon six grounds.
First, it is argued
that the property is not definitely and completely described, since a street address is
given without indicating in what city, county

-35-
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or state the property is situated.
By his
answer, the defendant admits that he owns the
property at 124 East Sth South Street in Salt
Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, so
that no uncertainty can arise by reason of ownership of several properties bearing the same
address.
No question arises as to the fact
that the parties in making such incomplete description intended to refer to no property other
than defendant's property at the indicated
address in Salt Lake City. Appellant's contention in this respect is disposed of by
prior decisions of this court.
In Easton v.
Thatcher, 7 Utah 99, 25 P. 728, a less specific
description than the one here involved was
held not so uncertain as to justify denial of
a decree.
It was there held that extrinsic
evidence may be introduced to show the exact
boundaries and location of property mentioned
in the contract of sale.
Cummings v. Nielson,
42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 622, is to the same
effect. We there said:
"It is elementary
that in equity that is certain which can be
made certain.
In case ,., '" ,., certain lands
are mentioned by name merely in a contract,
without giving a definite description, the
* * * lands intended in the contract may always
be shown by extrinsic, parol, or documentary
evidence." See also Pomeroy's Specific Performance of Contracts, 3rd Ed.Sec. 152.
Id. at 895.
(Emphasis added.)
This cited portion of the Johnson opinion is clearly applicable to
the facts of the instant case.

As in Johnson, the description in

Appellants' own pleading (Complaint in this case) along with the
heretofore cited evidence clearly indicates that there was never
any disagreement respecting the description of the property in
question.
Appellants make reference to the proposed annexation plat
referred to in the letter as if the same were a part of the record.
Unfortunately, it is not.

Appellants distort the record with an

erroneous quotation from the Klein letter of March 31, 1971 (R.305).

-36-
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Appellants, on page 57 and again on page 98 of their brief, erroneously and improperly quote the Klein letter as stating that he

~as

only annexing,
"that land which I am in fact buying from you."
Actually, the letter states,
"You will note that I am only proposing
that land be annexed which I am in fact
buying from you."__!}_/
The distinction is important in that it shows not Respondent's
statement of fact, but his proposal.

The proposed annexation plat

is not a matter of record and what it showed or did not show is a
matter of conjecture.

There is in the record (R.109) a copy not of

the proposed annexation plat referred to in the letter, but a copy
of the annexation plat as concluded, which demonstrates that the
property being retained by Mrs. Sandberg was also included in the
annexation.

The conclusion drawn by Appellants that the annexation

plats - the missing proposal and the finalized plat - show some
further variance in legal description is simply not substantiated
by the record.
The record clearly shows that the only two descriptions ever
used were those contained within the Earnest Money Agreement and
the Option Agreement.

The variance has heretofore been explained.

Appellants discussion about the letter of March 30th and the plats
relate only to suggestions, proposals and inquiries.

The matter

was concluded on the basis of the description contained within the
Earnest Money Agreement.

_!ii

It is the same description as that of the

It is interesting to note that Appellants' counsel correctly
quotes the letter on page 90 of their brief.
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--surveyor, Stevens, and the same description which Appellants in
their Complaint affirmatively allege they have optioned to Respondent.

It is also the same land described in the Real Estate Pur-

chase Contract prepared and executed by Respondent and forwarded to
Appellants.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that Appellants have not demonstrated that the land descriptions
were vague and contradictory.

Rather, the record and the findings

by the trial court persuasively prove that the description of the
?roperty optioned to Respondent has never been in doubt.
POINT VII
THE OPTION WAS PROPERLY EXERCISED
At pages 64-80 of their brief, Appellants argue that the
option was not properly exercised.

Appellants contend that in

order to exercise the option, Respondent was required to execute
and submit a purchase contract to Mrs. Sandberg prior to June 14,

1971.

They further argue that because no purchase contract was

submitted to Mrs. Sandberg prior to that date,
unexercised.

the option expired,

Appellants neglect to advise the Court that Mrs.

Sandberg requested that the survey, which was necessary for the
preparation of the purchase contract in question, be delayed as an
accomodation to her.

The delay requested by Mrs. Sandberg cannot

now be used to Appellants' advantage.
This Court in The Boyer Company v. E. Keith Lignell, No. 14442
(Utah, August 1, 1977) recently reiterated the principle of law
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that should govern the resolution of this issue.

The Court staced

This Court recognizes the principle of law
that a party to a real estate listing agreement cannot prevent or interfere with the performance of the agreement and then assert the
nonperformance as a defense.
This same principle of law was recognized by this Court in Cannon v.
Stevens School of Business,

Inc., 560 P. 2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1977):

A person cannot avoid liability for the nonperformance of its obligation by placing
such performance beyond his control by his
own voluntary act.
Furthermore, no one can
avail himself of the no~ erformance of a conition precedent, who has himse
occasioned
its non-perior~2nce. (Emphasis added.)
See also, Hoyt v.
(1953).

~asatch

Hornes,

1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 927,

930

In this case, Mrs. Sandberg requested a delay in the

survey which she knew would delay the preparation of the purchase
agreement and is now asserting this delay against Respondent.
On March 30, 1971, Respondent by his letter to Mrs. Sandberg
clearly indicated that he was exercising the option.
prior request for a survey and agreed thereto.

He noted her

He noted that they

had previously walked the fence line and he proposed a slight
modification to the description, but agreed to defer to her wishes.
He calculated the acreage to which he was entitled under the release
provision and requested a conveyance.

As required by the Option

Agreement, he took credit for only one-half of the option payments
and stated that:
Thereafter acreage to be released at the rate
of $200.00 per acre but with no consideration
for release of acreage for the $9,000.00 until
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all of the land has been paid for.
The remaining money of $9,000.00 to continued (sic)
throughout contract without benefit of acreage
release until the $9,000.00 is applied to the
last payment.
(R. 306)
Respondent then suggested that three things needed to be completed
in April and May:
1.

Complete survey to determine exact acreage.

2.

Arrive at exact selling price so that exact principal
payments could be determined.

3.

Prepare land purchase agreement consistent with terms of
Option Agreement and the accepted number of acres determined by the survey.
(R.305-307)

On June 7th, Mrs. Sandberg, not wanting to then pay one-half
of the quoted survey fee of $2,400.00, requested that the survey be
delayed until
near the time when she would be receiving the
first contract payment estimated to be $8,500.00
in the month of June 1972.
(Finding i/16 R. 374-375,
Klein Affidavit #18 R.341, Stevens Affidavit #5
R. 264).
Respondent acquiesced in the request of Mrs. Sandberg.
On that same date, June 7, 1971, Respondent paid and Mrs.
Sandberg accepted $2,000.00 with an endorsement on the face of the
check that it constituted "Down payment to commence June 15th
agreement, 1971" (R.308).

On that same day, June 7, 1971, Mrs.

Sandberg conveyed to Respondent 40 of the 55 acres to which Respondent was entitled (R. 311).

The other 15 acres were not conveyed

because Respondent was uncertain at that time as to which other 15
acres he wanted released and conveyed (Klein Deposition P.9).
During the months of April and May, Mrs. Sandberg represented

co the St. George City Planning Commission that Respondent was
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purchasing the property.

Sometime after December,

1971,

(sor.1c
rcprescntL~

seven months after the June 7th payment), Mrs. Sandberg

to third persons that Respondent was purchasing the property.
The Real Estate Purchase Contract could not be completed unt:'.
after the survey because the acreage, and the purchase price based
thereon at $200.00 per acre, could not be calculated.

Consequently

the preparation and execution by Respondent of the Real Estate
Purchase Contract was delayed until May of 1972 when the survey '•las
completed.

Under such circumstances and based on the above cited

authorities, Appellants cannot be heard to complain of Respondent's
failure to do that which Mrs. Sandberg's specific request caused

him not to do.
The foregoing discussion adequately answers Appellants' contention on page 65 of their brief that the exercise of the Option
Agreement by Respondent was improper as to form.

Respondent did

everything in his power to exercise the option according to its
terms.

To the extent the option was not exercised in strict ac-

cordance with its terms is directly attributable to Mrs. Sandberg.
On page 68 of their brief, Appellants cite authority and argue
that the "exercising documents" were on their face preliminary to
the exercise of the option.
best.

Appellants' argument is confusing at

They cite authorities which deal with options that required

the exercise thereof to be by written statements, and then attack
Respondent's March 30, 1971, letter as not complying with the
various standards discussed in the cited authorities.

The fatal

defect in this argument is that the option in question did not require a written formal notice in order to exercise the option.
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1

Appellants' argument and cited authorities are inapposite.

The

option in this case was to be exercised, as heretofore discussed,
in a manner that was delayed by Mrs. Sandberg.
At page 73 of their brief, Appellants argue that the tender of
the real estate contract in June, 1972, was not timely.
argument has been discussed amply above.

This

Under the circumstances

of Mrs. Sandberg's delay of the survey, the authorities cited above
make it clear that Appellants may not take advantage of a situation
caused by Mrs. Sandberg.
At page 77 of their brief, Appellants argue that the "exercising" documents were in fact a counteroffer.
authorities are not on point.

Appellants' cited

As heretofore discussed at pages 27-

28, the letter of March 30th contained some proposals to Mrs.
Sandberg that were rejected.

The record in no way supports Appel-

lants' contentions that the exercise of the option was conditioned
on any of these proposals.

The applicable rule of law in this

instance was stated by the court in Duprey v. Donahoe, 52 Wash. 2d
129, 323 P.2d 903 (1958).

That court held that where the acceptance

of an option to purchase realty is in the first instance unconditional,

the acceptance remains unconditional even though a mere

request is added for a departure from the terms of the option.
court stated:
Both the letter and the oral expression
made by the optionee established that the
option was being unconditionally accepted.
The general rule is that,

* * * If the optionee attaches conditions
not warranted by the terms of the option
to his acceptance or notice of his election
to buy, this itself amounts to a rejection;
-42-
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The

but it is otherwise where the acceptance is in
the first instance unconditional, and a mere
request is added for a departure from the
terms of the option as to the time and place
of completing the transaction.
55 Am.Jur. 508
§39.
To the same effect, 91 C.J.S. Vendor
§10, p.855.
Id. at 906.

& Purchaser

Appellants have not and cannot enumerate a single modification that
resulted from what they characterize as a "counteroffer".

The

rationality of Respondent's proposal to use the quarter section
line rather than the meandering fence as the east boundary is
readily apparent from an observation of the graphical illustration
on page 33(a), supra.

The facts are clear that Mrs. Sandberg

rejected the proposals in Respondent's letter.

She thereafter ac-

cepted the $2,000.00 down payment, she conveyed 40 acres to Respondent, she represented to the St. George Planning Commission that
Respondent was purchasing the property, and seven months after
accepting the $2,000.00 down payment she represented to third
persons that Respondent had purchased the property.

In view of

these uncontroverted facts, Appellants' argument that the exercise
of the option was a counteroffer that was never accepted is totallv
without merit.
POINT VIII
HUTUALITY IS PRESENT
Appellants commence their section on mutuality by rehashing
earlier sections of their brief on alternative contract provisions,
vagueness and ambiguity.

Respondent has treated these subjects
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eJrlier in this brief and will not repeat the same here.-2_/
\.fuile Appellants' argument on mutuality fails to distinguish
between mutuality of obligation and mutuality of remedy, there is
no problem in this case because both are present.
Appellants' argument implies that equivalance is required
between the parties in order to have a valid contract.

Neither

mutuality of obligation nor mutuality of remedy requires equivalance.

This Court in Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608,

237 P. 2d 823, 825 (1951) stated:
Moreover, a contract does not lack mutuality
merel because its terms are harsh or its
ob igations unequal, or ecause every o igation of one party is not met by an equivalent
counter obligation of the other party.
(Emphasis in original)
Likewise, with respect to mutuality of remedy, this Court stated
in Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P.2d 903, 934 (1938):
The development of the doctrine of mutuality
as to remedy reveals that it was founded on
the idea that one party should not have from
equity what the other party could not have

_J_/

The only authorities cited by Appellants in this section of
their brief do not deal with mutuality but with arguments
previously discussed.
At page 82 of their brief, Appellants
again cite and explain the Kline v. Rogerson decision.
Again,
Appellants have misrepresented the holding of that case. That
case and its holding are explained on page 21 of this brief.
At pages 82-83 of their brief, Appellants cite this Court's
decision in Candland v. Oldroyd, 67 Utah 605, 248 P.1101
(1926), which is neither factually nor legally applicable to
the instant case.
Unlike the facts of the instant case in
which formal written agreements between the parties extended
over 9 years, the Court in Candland v. Oldroyd was dealing
with the very basics of contract formation.
In Candland, this
Court held that there was no contract between the parties
because of a defective acceptance of an offer to sell.
In the
instant case, Appellants can make no such claim.
Mrs. Sandberg
accepted $19,000.00 over a period of nine years, including a
do1vn payment on the very contract in question.
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obtained had it applied.
The doctrine that
at the time of making of the contract there
must be mutual fixed obliFations is not tenable.
(Emphasis added.)
Mutuality consists of the obligation of each party to do, or
permit something to be done, in consideration of the act or promise
of the other.

17 C.J.S. Contracts §lOO(l)(a)(l963).

This Court in the

~llen

case, supra, speaking of mutuality,

equated it with consideration and stated:
(e)
The argument that there is no
mutuality of obligation in the instant case
simply conveys the objection that the defendant's promise of employment, being terminable
at will, is not sufficient consideration to
sustain the negative covenant.
Professor
Williston states that "no briefer definition
of sufficient consideration in a bilateral
contract can be given than this:
Mutual
promises in each of which the promisor undertakes some act or forbearance that will be, or
apparently may be, detrimental to the promisor
or beneficial to the promisee, and neither of
which is void, are sufficient consideration for
one another.
Williston on Contracts, Revised
Edition, Volume I, §103 F. (Emphasis added.)
In this case, Appellants had promised to sell the land and by
such promise subjected themselves to an action for Specific Performance.

Respondent had promised to purchase the land, had paid

$17,000.00 in option payments, had exercised the option and had
made a $2,000.00 doi;·m payment.

Respondent had further agreed and

promised that in the event of his default, he would forfeit the
payments made.
On page 84 of their brief, Appellants ask:

"The salient

question is, what would a court have found had Mrs. Sandberg sued,
alleging the Option Agreement and the letter and check as a con-
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tract against Klein?"

The answer can be given without hesitation:

Mrs. Sandberg would have had the contractual default remedies
available to her.
The Earnest Money Receipt provides,
Said contract shall contain the usual provision for forfeiture in the event of
default by the buyer .
(R.295)
Paragraph Sf of the Option Agreement which "ratified" (R.298)
the option set forth in the Earnest Money Receipt provides,
f.
In the event of default by the Buyer
under the Option Agreement or under the Contract to Purchase, such land as has not been
conveyed by deed to buyer shall revert to the
Seller, and any advance payment as of such
time of default shall be forfeited by the
buyer and remain the property of the seller
as liquidated damages.
(R.301,302)
It is seen from the documents that the seller's remedy in the
event of a default of the buyer is that of a forfeiture of the consideration paid by the buyer.

This right of the seller to forfeit

the buyer's payments in the event of his default was not lost to
the seller by the absence of a formal contract on or before June 14,
1971.

There is no conceivable fact situation under the documents

where the Appellants ever lost or will ever lose the right to declare a forfeiture in the event of default.
Appellants note on page 84 of their brief that there is not a
signed copy of the March 30th letter in the file.
clear that Respondent delivered the letter.
clear that Mrs. Sandberg received the letter.

The record is

The record is likewise
Since the letter was

delivered to and received by Mrs. Sandberg, it must be presumed
that she has the original thereof.

With respect to Appellants'
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argument on mutuality the presence or absence of the letter seems
of little import.

Respondent's promise to forfeit did not in anv

way depend upon the not yet executed contract nor the letter.
POI:H IX
SPECIFIC PERFORHANCE IS THE
ONLY REMEDY AND HAS PROPER

The matters set forth in subsections a., b., c. and d. on pages
87 through 93 of Appellants' brief are repetitious and have been
previously discussed.

Respondent has countered each of these argu-

ments at least once in the foregoing pages of this brief.

In surnrnar

it can be said that Respondent exercised the option in June of 1971
with a notation on his June 7th check that it constituted
down payment to cormnence June 15th agreement,
1971
and that Mrs. Sandberg accepted the same.
Appellants on page 94 of their brief in the subsection e. call
to the Court's attention a mathematical error.

In his letter of

March 30, Respondent stated that he had previously paid $18,000.00.
The evidence now is that he had paid at that time only $17,000.00
and that with the down payment he had paid a total of $19,000.00 anc
not $20,000.00.

The error was first discovered late during the

course of this litigation.

Appellants are certainly entitled to

a correction and a principal balance due of $67,368.00 and not
$66,368.00.

Respondent so stipulates.

Respondent asserts, however, that under the facts and circurnstances, the mathematical error does not justify the reversal of
the trail court's Judgment.

It was an error in the March 30th
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letter to which Mrs. Sandberg didn't object.

She accepted the

$2,000.00 down payment some two months after receipt of the letter.
Her counsel in the pre-litigation correspondence never asserted the
~athematical

error as a reason for refusing to proceed.

counsel never raised the issue with the trial court.
not minimize the value of one thousand dollars,

Appellants'

While we do

the legal effect of

the one thousand dollar error under the circumstances of this case
is de minimus and is easily repaired.
Equity should deny to Appellants the relief they now claim for
the mathematical error.
CONCLUSION
Specific Performance is an equitable remedy.

Respondent

submits that an objective view of the equities involved will compel
the conclusion that the Judgment of the Trial Court ordering
Specific Performance should be affirmed.
Respondent faithfully performed the terms of the Earnest Money
Receipt and the Option Agreement.

He timely made every payment

provided for therein and those payments were accepted by Mrs.
Sandberg.

Respondent caused the property to be annexed to the City

of St. George.
the survey.

He caused the property to be surveyed and paid for

In March of 1971, some nine (9) years after the Earnest

Money Receipt and some seven (7) years after the Option Agreement,
and after making two (2) payments each year, totaling $17,000.00,
Respondent advised Mrs. Sandberg that he would be exercising the
option in June of 1971.
the survey.

He requested her cooperation in completing

He paid to the County of Washington a $100. 00 fee for

-48-
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the establishment of a survey marker.
accepted on June 7,

He paid and '!rs. Sandt>cq;

1971, a $2,000.00 down payment to exercise th~

option and to put the contract into effect.
request of Mrs.

He acquiescc:>d in the

Sandberg that the survey be delayed,

ing the completion of a formal contract.

thereby delay-

In April of 1972, when

Respondent discovered Mrs. Sandberg's reluctance to proceed with
the survey, he took the initiative, ordered the survey,

paid for

the same, prepared a contract and signed it and forwarded the same
to Mrs. Sandberg, together with the first required annual payment
almost one month before the first annual payment was due under the
terms of the Option Asreement and the anticipated contract.
It is obvious from the foregoing that Respondent proceeded
with good faith,

in making payments, making arrangements for the

annexation, arranging and paying for the survey and preparing and
signing the contract and by doing every proper possible thing he
could to exercise his rights and to see the purchase of the property to a conclusion.
In contrast,
equities.
years.

the position of Appellants is entirely devoid of

Mrs. Sandberg accepted $19,000 over a period of nine (9)

The final $2,000.00 was accepted June 7,

1971, as the down

payment required by the terms of the option to exercise the same.
Mrs. Sandberg acknowledged that the option had been exercised by
releasing and conveying 40 acres to Respondent.

She watched,

urged, supported and cooperated '"ith Respondent with respect to
annexing and surveying matters.

She filed an inventory and ap-

praisement in the matter of the Estate of Wayne Sandberg which
neglected to reflect the contract rights of Respondent and she
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r~quested

a delay in the survey.

Sometime after December,

1971,

she stated to others that Respondent had purchased the property.
Then,

in May of 1972, some ten (10) years after the original

Earnest Money Receipt and after receipt by her of $19,000.00, did
~rs.

Sandberg first assert that Respondent's rights had terminated.
The legal technicalities, niceties, arguments and sophistry

set forth in the 103 page brief of Appellants do not support the
conclusions claimed by Appellants and they certainly do not change
the equities.

To grant to Appellants the relief sought by them to

quiet title and to forfeit the Respondent's payments and his
efforts and expenses with respect to the property would be inequitable and unjust in the extreme.
It is only equitable that this Court affirm the Judgment and
Decree of Specific Performance made and entered by the Trial Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

.:2-{

day of August, 1977.

WATKISS

& CAMPBELL

~L\··~

(J

Jam" p

coC~)

By&r(~
All an T. Br iTikeihOff
310 South Main Street, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 363-3300
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CER:IFICA7E OF

~~ILI~G

The undersigned hereby certifies that
,:_;:c:'._es of t\ce foregoing :SRIEF OF
~e=e~n

bv

~ailing

to their attorney
~ 3e~le,

"),..- q

RESPO:~DE::T

~e

served two (2)

U?On Appellants

copies hereof, first class, postage prepaid,
~ichael

D. Hughes of Allen, Thoopson, Hughes

148 East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah 84770, this

day of August, 1977.
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